Few people outside of Spain have even heard of the post-Colonial drama of the Sarhawi people who live to this day in the Western Sahara.upi.com But that's something Javier Bardem wants to change.frontiersin.org The Spanish actor has thrown his weight behind the documentary as producer and star to focus some of his starlight on one of the darker corners of the world. The Hollywood Reporter's Spain Bureau Chief Pamela Rolfe talked to Bardem about the documentary, the Sahara and optimism. THR: This is clearly a personal project. I know that your contact with the Sahrawi people came while at a film festival, but what was it that really moved you about that experience?
Bardem: There are many reasons why I was moved by the experiences I had in the refugee camps. I suppose if I had to identify one to summarize it would be seeing the legacy as Spaniards that we left to the Sarhawis. That really gives you a different kind of responsibility. Of course, it wouldn't be the same if the Sarhawis weren't how they are-- so generous. I didn't find any hate or resentment toward us, but the opposite. The Spanish population helps the Sarhawis in a big way -- in a private way. So we want to help and we made the documentary because that's the way we can.
You cannot change the world. But we can bring that story to some other people who may not be aware of it. In the end, those stories that are not told are stories that don't exist in people's minds. THR: Outside Spain, the Western Sahara is largely an unknown problem. It's not even on the radar. How would you explain the situation and Spain's historic role to a complete outsider? Bardem: That's actually why we tried to do the documentary, because it's not very easy to make sense of it. This film is about the Sarhawis. But in the end, it's about a lot of stories in the world that happen to be the same. Because they are not on the radar, as you say, they're not important.
If they're not "important," then people don't move to try to change them. When I say people, I do mean society -- but I also mean governments that have the power to change the landscape. Imagine the situation between Israel and Palestine. It's such a big mess. You can be on one side or the other. But what's clear is that there's an urgent need for a solution there and that's been dragging on for so long. So you can imagine how much more difficult for a people like the Sarhawis that are so much less -- less population, less support.
It's important to talk about a situation that people are not aware of and yet those people are having a really hard time to survive. The world is full of these stories. We didn't choose it. THR: There's a moment when you are interviewing Aminatou Haidar when she talks about the growing frustration with non-violence by saying she can no longer find the words to guide younger generations. It's a key moment. What do you see as the path for the Sarhawi people? Bardem: She's an amazing lady who has lived through so many incredible situations. It's very powerful to hear that from a person recognized as a peace leader in the world.
THR: Something depicted nicely in the film is not just a possible changing in strategy, but a changing of the guard from one generation to the next. Bardem: People have been born and raised in refugee camps.youtube.com Those people don't know what the older generation knew, their land, their future, their possibilities. THR: Not to minimize the effect of the film, but I'm curious if there's anything else aside from the hefty weight of your prestige and celebrity and the cost of the film that you have invested in this cause? Have you created some foundation or some economic support? Bardem: Alvaro and I and others I know try -- and sometimes we succeed -- in a private, anonymous way in order for them to have better conditions. But that goes along with all the Spanish society that I mentioned before.
There is a lot of awareness in the Spanish society. They bring kids here in the summertime because summers there are unbearable. They bring them here to Spain to see doctors. They send money and they send food. But that's not the goal. The goal is to try to change the scenario and for them to have what they deserve -- their land, their right to make a living out of their land. I could name thousands of people who are helping in a private way. That's not what it should be. We wanted to put it all together so people understand and can know what to ask of their governments in the political forums.
But if you're asking about foundations, there are many pro-Sarhawi foundations in Spain and, of course, we can work through that, but if this film makes any money at all, it'll go straight to the refugee camp. But it's not just the film, there are many private initiatives. THR: Many people outside Spain might not know the Bardem family's link with political activism. But it's something you come by honestly, no? Bardem: It's not something you choose. It's not something you carry like a flag. It's a part of your education. I've seen people in my family doing whatever they could, however they could, in order to help to create a better way in a very humble way. What you see when you are little, stays with you. It stays a sense of humor, a way you eat or the way you enjoy a book.
It's a part of your education. THR: Would you consider yourself an optimist? Bardem: Wow. In general? Ah … I believe in people. THR: And with respect to this particular situation? Bardem: I do. Alvaro and I were at the United Nations and we had the chance to be there for three or four days and speak to a lot of people. And there's an awareness for example of the violation of human rights is so strong that I'm optimistic in that sense that it will be supervised there's a sense that it has to be transformed. Transformed so they can have the freedom of speech, freedom to belong to different ideologies without being in prison or tortured. In that sense, the Arab Spring has taught us that it's possible. Even in the darkest regions, people have discovered their right of freedom.
And yes, I'm optimistic in that sense. THR: The number of languages used in the film highlights what an international problem it is. Bardem: When we got there, we thought it was a local problem with the Spanish government. We made a journey, and as we make the journey, we discovered how many governments are actually involved in this problem. And of course, how many languages. I was amazed about the knowledge of the situation in so many different forums. Of course, on a street level, it's not a very well known crisis. But in political circles, it is. THR: So what do you take away from the experience of making this documentary?
Bardem: I'm lucky in that I know a lot of good and capable people that can make it happen. We all need people. Human beings are not an island. I know a lot of people in different crafts. In this one, Alvaro has really worked hard to make it happen over the past four years. It's been a long road, and we're happy we have something to show. We wanted to make something real that people can have an opinion after watching it. In this case, it wasn't easy because you have to fight hard for people to speak. We weren't looking to jeopardize anyone. We just want people to learn and to take them through the journey of why this situation keeps being the same for so long.
Indeed, over the past year-plus, three new Islamic State affiliatesa have gained prominence in sub-Saharan Africa. Besides their emergence at broadly similar times, this article examines the commonalities these three new Islamic State franchises in Africa have with one another as well as their convergences and divergences at the ideological, operational, and strategic levels. It also assesses what their presence could mean in the long-term. However, in late 2016, the group showed itself to be far from defunct. In the last quarter of 2016, it carried out three notable attacksd near the borders of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali. The first attack occurred on the nights of September 1-2, 2016, when ISGS targeted a gendarmerie in Burkina Faso near the Nigerien border and killed two guards.
The second occurred about a month later on October 12. The group attacked a police outpost in Intoum, Burkina Faso, just kilometers from the Mali border, which killed three police.fodors.com Though the question of why it took so long for the Islamic State to acknowledge ISGS’s bay`a has percolated in various outlets, three factors are likely at play. First, the newly proven capacity of ISGS to carry out deadly attacks, as highlighted by its two notable efforts in October 2016, signaled to the Islamic State that ISGS was more than just a nominal fighting force. Second, the Islamic State’s losses of land in Syria, Iraq, and Libya throughout 2016 have highlighted its vulnerabilities.
Yet, because of its concomitant need to appear viable and expanding, ISGS was likely viewed as a welcome addition to forward that illusion. Third, the Islamic State’s decision to recognize ISGS was likely simultaneously informed by the disarray plaguing its other affiliate in the region, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), formerly (and to a degree, currently) known as Boko Haram. Since coming under the leadership of Abubakr Shekau in 2009, the group had always been aligned with al-Qa`ida. Yet, in March 2015, Shekau pledged bay`a to the Islamic State, which it accepted, transforming Boko Haram— at least nominally—into the first (and still only) sub-Saharan African Islamic State wilaya, known as Wilayat West Africa. Yet the marriage remained fraught.
In light of these tensions, the Islamic State announced in August 2016 that Shekau had been replaced by Abu Musab al-Barnawi, believed to be the son of Boko Haram’s founder, Mohammed Yusuf. For his part, Shekau rejected the change in leadership, asserting that he remained in charge of ISWAP/Boko Haram. The second relatively new Islamic State affiliate in sub-Saharan Africa is known as the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS). The group, which emerged in 2015 when it broke away from al-Shabaab, is led by Abdulqadir Mumin. Somali by birth, Mumin spent years in Sweden and the United Kingdom, gaining citizenship in the latter, where he earned a reputation as an extremist cleric. In 2010, he returned to Somalia to fight inside al-Shabaab.desertusa.com Once in Somalia, he was sent to the relatively remote northern Puntland region—distanced from al-Shabaab’s primary area of operation, much further south near Mogadishu—in 2012 to attract recruits.
Back in Puntland, and serving as a relatively autonomous al-Shabaab commander in the Galaga mountains, Mumin began to consider himself the commander of a separate entity, despite having no battlefield experience. Nevertheless, operationally, ISS has arguably been the most powerful of the new Islamic State affiliates in sub-Saharan Africa. On October 26, 2016, approximately 50 members of ISS seized the port town of Qandala in the Bari region of Puntland, making the town the first territory the Islamic State has held inside Somalia. This was particularly worrisome as Qandala’s location would have given the group port access on the Gulf of Aden and potentially afforded it proximity to linkages with Yemen. As of late December 2016, however, Qandala is reported to have completely fallen to Somali maritime forces.11 Regardless, ISS’s holding of the town, even for a short time, could be interpreted as an important symbolic victory for the group.
Beyond simply denying the Puntland Islamic State affiliates physical land, security forces inside Puntland are pushing back. The third important, and even newer, Islamic State-affiliated group in sub-Saharan Africa is Jahba East Africa, which is also known as the Islamic State in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (ISISSKTU). Like the Islamic State in Somalia, ISISSKTU is a splinter group of al-Shabaab. Operationally, Jahba East Africa has proven to be more of an ideological threat than a physical one.lonelyplanet.com "Al-Shabaab has become stubborn, arrogant and refuses to accept the Khalifah. Today, Al-Shabaab ONLY jails and kills innocent Mujahideen from East Africa.
Today, Al-Shabaab is weak, and everyday Mujahideen from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are leaving to join the Khalifah. How then do these three newer and lesser-known sub-Saharan African pro-Islamic State groups compare to one another? All three demonstrate some degree of commonality. First, each emerged as breakaway groups when the leadership of their predecessor groups decided to remain loyal to al-Qa`ida. Moreover, all three groups emerged around the same time, in mid-2015, just as the Islamic State was exhibiting the height of its power. Third, none of the groups are particularly large, nor are they very well-understood. Yet, there are indeed notable differences between the three Saharan and sub-Saharan African Islamic State affiliates.
For one, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara might be thought to be slightly more institutionalized than those Islamic State affiliates in the East African region. This is the case for two reasons. First, it is the only one of the "new" Islamic State affiliates whose bay`a to the Islamic State has actually been acknowledged. Second, ISGS is the only one of these groups to have carried out multiple attacks. What does the current operational environment suggest for the future of these new Islamic State-affiliated groups in Africa? While speculative, it could be argued that as the Islamic State’s fortunes decline—with the likely fall of Mosul in 2017 and impending attack on the Islamic State’s Syrian stronghold of Raqqa—so too might these groups’ loyalty to the Islamic State.
In light of this, what should we expect to be the nature of interaction between Islamic State-affiliated groups and al-Qa`ida-affiliated groups on the ground? Answers are mixed depending on the region. In the Horn, more conflict between Islamic State-affiliated groups and al-Qa`ida-affiliated groups seems likely. First, al-Qa`ida-affiliated al-Shabaab is already known to have attacked and killed many of its pro-Islamic State defectors. Second, it is not at all likely that al-Shabaab leadership will soon reverse course to support the Islamic State’s overtures. Dr. Jason Warner is an assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and an associate at the Combating Terrorism Center. He holds a Ph.D. African Studies from Harvard University. It should be noted that although this article refers to these groups as "Islamic State affiliates," this terminology is used in a colloquial (not technical) sense.
Despite the fact that this article refers to these groups as the "Islamic State in X," these nomenclatures are derivatives of Western media and analytical practices and not always reflective of the names by which the groups refer to themselves. After Sahraoui’s defection, the shura council of al-Mourabitoun declared Belmokhtar the new leader of the group in August 2015. Under his leadership, al-Mourabitoun has been firmly allied with al-Qa`ida. Despite these notable attacks, others have argued that ISGS has, in fact, carried out many other attacks without claiming responsibility. The group is believed to have kidnapped and to still be holding a Romanian national, abducted by Sahraoui’s contingent in Tambao, Burkina Faso in 2015, just before it officially split from Belmokhtar’s contingent of al-Mourabitoun.
Moreover, ISGS seems to understand its area of operation to be quite wide, having issued threats, for example, against the United Nations in Western Sahara as well as civilians and other targets of the Moroccan state. Despite Shekau’s "ouster," even his offshoot group seems not to have fully renounced its allegiances to the Islamic State. Given that both he and al-Barnawi seem to be in broad agreement that al-Baghdadi is the caliph—even after the split—this indeed signals some potential for reconciliation between the two factions. For its part, the al-Shabaab internal security service, known as the amniyat, has been known to arrest its members who sympathize with ISS. Moreover, a senior official of al-Shabaab in the Middle Juba region of Somalia, who was known to be sympathetic to the al-Shabaab/Islamic State merger, was ambushed and killed by other al-Shabaab members. See Jason Warner, "Choosing Alliances, Creating Fissures: How the Emergence of ISIS in Africa Affects the Relationships Between Boko Haram, Al-Shebab, and Al-Qaeda," OE Watch: Foreign News & Perspectives of the Operational Environment 6:10 (2016): pp.
Fighting erupted there in 1976 between Morocco and the Polisario Front following the Spanish colonial administration’s withdrawal. The violence quickly drove hundreds of thousands of Saharawi refugees to flee across the border and into neighbouring Algeria, where they remain to this day. Almost two decades later, the violence has subsided but both parties are still at odds despite ongoing UN-mediated talks. While Morocco supports autonomy for the Saharawis, the Polisario Front says the territory’s final status should be decided in an independence referendum. Mr. Ross, a former United States diplomat with a long and distinguished career, says in the interview that it is high-time to end the Western Sahara conflict and the human tragedy that it has engendered. UN News Centre: What is the conflict in the Western Sahara all about?
Christopher Ross: Well, as you know the Western Sahara is a former Spanish colony, roughly the size of Great Britain but with a population of just a few hundred thousand. Its legal status has been in dispute since well before the Spanish withdrawal in 1975-76. The parties to this dispute currently are the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front. Morocco, which has controlled most of Western Sahara since the 1970s, insists that the Western Sahara must become an autonomous part of Morocco on the basis of negotiations with the Polisario and a yes/no referendum. The Polisario, for its part, argues that the people of Western Sahara must be free to choose their own future through a referendum that includes the option of independence.
From 1975 to 1991 there were open hostilities between these two parties, heavy fighting, but in 1991 a ceasefire was implemented as part of a UN-led settlement effort. It should be noted that while this is no longer a fighting war, it is still a tense and dangerous situation. The UN continues to work to encourage a settlement and to improve the well-being of the people whose lives have been tragically affected. It’s not enough to keep talking on the basis of fixed positions; the solution must reflect a political will and concrete steps to move. UN News Centre: So, what is the UN doing?
Christopher Ross: Well, since the mid-1980s the UN has taken two distinct approaches to this conflict under the guidance of the Security Council. The first, which lasted until 2004, was based on several settlement plans that were put forward to the parties for their approval. None of these settlement plans worked. They all called for a referendum but the parties were never able to agree who would be eligible to vote. In 2004, a second phase began and this phase continues to this day. This one is based on direct negotiations between the parties. To assist the parties in making progress, the Secretary-General has appointed a Personal Envoy to act as a mediator and facilitator.
In the context of this new phase, in April 2007, the two parties put forward their proposals for a settlement of the conflict to the Security Council, and ever since then these have formed the basis for discussion. I should note that these political efforts to foster a settlement are not the only forms of UN involvement. The UN family has been active on several fronts. Separated families meet up again during a family visit in Western Sahara. It has worked to implement confidence-building measures to facilitate the return of the refugees once a settlement is reached. It has also maintained a small peacekeeping force in Western Sahara known as MINURSO, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.
And, finally, it has taken an increased interest in human rights as the parties to the conflict have increasingly accused each other of serious violations of these rights. UN News Centre: What about the human dimension to this ongoing conflict? Christopher Ross: Unfortunately, the demands of burning issues around the world and the absence of imminent crisis in Western Sahara have worked to deprive this conflict of the attention it deserves from the international community. But a settlement is, in fact, long overdue not least because of its human dimension. Ensuring a safe return of the Sahrawi refugees in Algeria to their homes under honourable conditions has been my highest objective. I first visited the refugee camps in the 1970s. I returned there beginning in 2009 and I found, much to my dismay, little had changed.
It is unacceptable, in my view, that for 37 years, these refugees have lived in miserable conditions because of a political dispute whose main actors have engaged in endless battles on the ground, at the negotiating table, in international fora. And I think we should never lose site of the people caught in the middle of this conflict. UN News Centre: Why is this proving so difficult to solve? Why is it taking so long? Christopher Ross: Essentially, the two sides have maintained positions that are mutually exclusive and neither has been willing to yield one inch. Polisario continues to insist that the final status of Western Sahara must be determined by its people; Morocco continues to insist that the only possible solution is an agreed autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. The Security Council has been encouraging the parties to negotiate and has refrained from considering imposing a solution.
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