Automatic process control and batch/sequence control during start-up, normal operation, shutdown, and disturbance.us-cert.gov Prevention of automatic or manual control actions which might initiate a hazard.youtube.com These functions are normally provided by, alarm, protection (trip, interlocks and emergency shutdown), and process control systems. These engineered systems are individually and collectively described as control systems, and may be independent, or share elements such as the human interface, plant interface, logic, utilities, environment and management systems. The human interface may comprise a number of input and output components, such as controls, keyboard, mouse, indicators, annunciators, graphic terminals, mimics, audible alarms, and charts. The plant interface comprises inputs (sensors), outputs (actuators), and communications (wiring, fibre optic, analogue/digital signals, pneumatics, fieldbus, signal conditioning, barriers, and trip amplifiers). Utilities are the power supplies and physical elements required for the systems, such as electricity and instrument air.
Modern instrumented control systems are generally electrical, electronic or programmable electronic systems (E/E/PES), but some purely pneumatic systems may still be in operation. All elements of the system which are required to perform the safety function, including utilities, are safety related, and should be considered part of the safety related system. Safety related control systems operating in continuous or high demand mode where the E/E/PES is the primary risk reduction measure have been known as HIPS (high integrity protective systems). It should be noted that control systems for equipment under control which are not safety related as defined above may also contribute to safety and should be properly designed, operated and maintained. A control system operating in continuous or high demand mode, for which a failure rate of less than 10-5/hr is claimed in order to demonstrate a tolerable risk, provides safety functions, and is safety related.
In some circumstances, the safety function may require the operator to take action, in which case, he/she is part of the safety related system and will contribute significantly to the probability of failure on demand (PFD). Typically, in a well designed system, a figure of 10-1 is assumed for the probability of an operator failing to take correct action on demand. The integrity required of a safety related system depends upon the level of risk reduction claimed for the safety function to be performed. Safety integrity is the probability that safety related system will satisfactorily perform the required safety function under all stated conditions within a stated period of time when required to do so. Safety integrity is therefore a function of performance and availability.
Performance is the ability of the system or device to perform the required safety function in a timely manner under all relevant conditions so as to achieve the required state. Availability is the measure of readiness of the system to perform the required safety function on demand, and is usually expressed in terms of probability of failure on demand. Independence (the ability of the system to act alone, without dependence on other protective measures, control systems or common utilities or to be influenced by them. Protection against systematic and common mode failures by a properly managed safety lifecycle, independence from common utilities, common management systems and other protective systems, and by diversity. Historically, little industry guidance has been available for qualifying or quantifying safety integrity levels to achieve to achieve a requisite risk reduction.
Additional guidance has also been available in EEMUA 160 Safety related instrument systems for the process industries. However, most major companies will have developed internal standards which relate safety related system integrity to required risk reduction.endress.com These standards are likely to address the design process, system configuration, and demonstration that the required risk reduction has been achieved by qualitative or quantitative analysis of the failure rate of the design. They will also have procedures to ensure that the integrity is maintained during commissioning, operation, maintenance, and modification. The latest applicable standard is BS IEC 61508 ‘Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems’ which is in 7 parts.
Parts 1, 3, 4, are published as British Standards, Part 5 is issued as an international IEC standard, and Parts 2, 6 and 7 remain in draft form. Integrity levels for safety related systems may be determined from the hazard and risk analysis of the equipment under control. A number of different methodologies are available, but the process includes identification of hazards and the mechanisms which can initiate them, risk estimation (likelihood of occurrence), and risk evaluation (overall risk based on likelihood and consequences). The risk estimation provides a measure of the risk reduction required to reduce the risk to a tolerable level.
Hazard identification results in the identification of safety functions which are required to control the risk. The safety functions may then be allocated to a number of different systems including E/E/PES, other technology and external measures. For each system providing a safety function, a failure rate measure can be assigned which in turn determines the integrity required of the system. IEC 61508 assigns four software and hardware safety integrity levels (SILs) to required measures of risk reduction. The requirement is more demanding for subsystems which do not have well defined behaviour modes or behaviour (e.g. programmable systems). The standard requires that a reliability model of the system architecture be created and the reliability predicted and compared with the target safety integrity level to confirm that the required risk reduction has been achieved.
It is necessary to demonstrate that the required level of integrity has been achieved in the design, installation, operation and maintenance of the system. It should be noted that the integrity of a safety related system is critically dependant upon the detection and correction of dangerous failures. Where there is a low level of diagnostic coverage, as is usually the case with lower integrity systems, then the integrity is critically dependent upon the proof test interval. SIL levels are now being quoted for proprietary subsystems (and certified by test bodies). Quoted SILs should be associated with proof test intervals, diagnostic coverage and fault tolerance criteria. They are useful for evaluation of architectural constraints, but do not eliminate the requirement to confirm that the requires safety integrity level for the safety function provided by the system has been achieved. Software includes high level user application programmes and parameter settings.
Alarm systems alert operators to plant conditions, such as deviation from normal operating limits and to abnormal events, which require timely action or assessment. Alarm systems are not normally safety related, but do have a role in enabling operators to reduce the demand on the safety related systems, thus improving overall plant safety. EEMUA 191 ‘Alarm systems - a guide to design, management and procurement’ considers alarm settings, the human interface (alarm presentation), alarm processing and system management controls for both safety related and other alarm systems. The claimed operator workload and performance should be stated and verified. Alarms which are not designated as safety should be carefully designed to ensure that they fulfil their role in reducing demands on safety related systems.
For all alarms, regardless of their safety designation, attention is required to ensure that under abnormal condition such as severe disturbance, onset of hazard, or emergency situations, the alarm system is remains effective given the limitations of human response. The extent to which the alarm system survives common cause failures, such as a power loss, should also be adequately defined. Further guidance is available in EEMUA 191 ‘Alarm systems - a guide to design, management and procurement’, and CHID circular CC/Tech/Safety/9. The type of alarm and its setting should be established so as to enable the operator to make the necessary assessment and take the required timely action. Settings should be documented and controlled in accordance with the alarm system management controls. The human interface should be suitable.
Alarms may be presented either on annunciator panel, individual indicators, VDU screen, or programmable display device. Alarms lists should be carefully designed to ensure that high priority alarms are readily identified, that low priority alarms are not overlooked, and that the list remains readable even during times of high alarm activity or with repeat alarms. Alarms should be prioritised in terms of which alarms require the most urgent operator attention. Alarms should be presented within the operators field of view, and use consistent presentation style (colour, flash rate, naming convention). Each alarm should provide sufficient operator information for the alarm condition, plant affected, action required, alarm priority, time of alarm and alarm status to be readily identified.
The visual display device may be augmented by audible warnings which should at a level considerably higher than the ambient noise at the signal frequency. Where there are multiple audible warnings, they should be designed so that they are readily distinguished from each other and from emergency alarm systems. They should be designed to avoid distraction of the operator in high operator workload situations. Where both constant frequency and variable frequency (including pulsed or intermittent) signals are used, then the later should denote a higher level of danger or a more urgent need for intervention. The alarms should be processed in such a manner as to avoid operator overload at all times (alarm floods). The alarm processing should ensure that fleeting or repeating alarms do not result in operator overload even under the most severe conditions.
A number of alarm processing techniques include filtering, deadband, debounce timers, and shelving, are described in EEMUA 191 ‘Alarm systems - a guide to design, management and procurement’. Care should be taken in the use of shelving or suppression to ensure that controls exist to ensure that alarms are returned to an active state when they are relevant to plant operation. Management systems should be in place to ensure that the alarm system is operated, maintained and modified in a controlled manner. Alarm response procedures should be available, and alarm parameters should be documented. The performance of the alarms system should be assessed and monitored to ensure that it is effective during normal and abnormal plant conditions.
The monitoring should include evaluation of the alarm presentation rate, operator acceptance and response times, operator workload, standing alarm count and duration, repeat or nuisance alarms, and operator views of operability of the system. Monitoring may be achieved by regular and systematic auditing. Matters which are not worthy of operator attention should not be alarmed. Logging may be a suitable alternative for engineering or discrepancy events to prevent unnecessary standing alarms. A system for assessing the significance of such logged events to ensure timely intervention by maintenance personnel may be required. Protection systems should indicate that a demand to perform a safety function has been made and that the necessary actions have been performed. Protective systems should be sufficiently independent of the control system or other protective systems (electrical/electronic or programmable).
Measures to defend against common mode failures due to environmental interactions may include physical separation or segregation of system elements (sensors, wiring, logic, actuators or utilities) of different protective systems. Independence will also be required for protection against systematic and common mode faults. Measures may include use of diverse technology for different protective systems. The action required from the protective system depend upon the nature of the process. Active protective measures have a high dependence upon utilities, and may be particularly vulnerable to common mode failures. The scope of the protective system therefore includes all utilities upon which it depends, and they should have an integrity consistent and contributory to that of the remainder of the system. The protective system should be adequately protected against environmental influences, the effects of the hazard against which it is protecting, and other hazards which may be present.
Degradation of protection against environmental influences during maintenance and testing should have been considered and appropriate measures taken. Use of radios by maintenance personnel may be prohibited during testing of a protective system with the cabinet door open where the cabinet provides protection against EMR. The architecture of the protective system should be designed to protect against random hardware failure. It should be demonstrated that the required reliability has been achieved commensurate with the require integrity level. Defensive measures may include high reliability elements, automatic diagnostic features to reveal faults, and redundancy of elements (e.g. 2 out of 3 voting for sensors) to provide fault tolerance.
Diversity of elements is not effective for protection against random hardware faults, but is useful in defence against common mode failures within a protective system. Protection against systematic hardware and software failures may be achieved by appropriate safety lifecycles (see IEC 61508, Out of Control). Sensors include their connection to the process, both of which should be adequately reliable. A measure of their reliability is used in confirming the integrity level of the protective system. This measure should take into account the proportion of failures of the sensor and its process connection which are failures to danger. Monitoring of protective system process variable measurement (PV) and comparison against the equivalent control system PV either by the operator or the control system.
Guidance on process connection is provided in BS 6739 British Standard Code of practice for instrumentation in process control systems: Installation design and practice. Proof testing procedures should clearly set out how sensors are reinstated and how such reinstatement is verified after proof testing. Maintenance procedures should define how sensors/transmitters are calibrated with traceability back to national reference standards by use of calibrated test equipment. Protection against systematic failures on programmable sensors/analysers. The measures taken will depend on the level of variability and track record of the software. Integrity of process connections and sensors for containment (sample or impulse lines, instrument pockets are often a weak link in process containment measures).
Use of ‘SMART’ instruments requires adequate diagnostic coverage and fault tolerance (see architectural constraints in IEC 61508 Part 2), and measures to protect against systematic failures (software design/integration, inadvertent re-ranging during maintenance). Measures may include use of equipment in non-smart mode (analogue signal output, no remote setting) and equipment of stable design for which there is an extensive record of reliability under similar circumstances. Actuators are frequently the most unreliable part of the tripping process.youtube.com Use of ‘fail-safe’ principles so that the actuator takes up the tripped state on loss of signal or power (electricity, air etc.). Actuator exercising or partial stroke shutoff simulation during normal operation to reveal failures or degradation in performance.
Actuators may also include programmable control elements (e.g. SMART instruments) particularly within positioners and variable speed drives and motor control centres. Modern motor control centres may use programmable digital addressing. This introduces a significant risk of introduction of systematic failure and failure modes which cannot be readily predicted. Such an arrangement should be treated with caution. Potential for failure due to hydraulic locking between valves (e.g. trace heated lines between redundant shutoff valves). Commonly, the logic systems for protective systems are electronic, but programmable and other technology systems (magnetic or fluidic/pneumatic) have been used. The architecture of the logic system will be determined by the hardware fault tolerance requirements, for example dual redundant channels. Where a high level of integrity for the system is required (SIL3 or SIL4) then diverse hardware between channels may be employed. This should not be confused with diversity of independent protective systems.
Logic systems are likely to incorporate provisions for fault alarms and overrides, for which there should be suitable management control arrangements. They may also provide monitoring of input and output signal lines for detection of wiring (open circuit, short circuit) and sensors/actuators (stuck-at, out of range). Such monitoring may initiate an alarm, a trip action or, in a voting arrangement, disable the faulty element. Software based systems should be adequately protected against systematic failures, for example by an appropriate hardware and software safety lifecycles, and suitable techniques and quality systems. Guidance is available in BS IEC 61508 Part 3, PES Parts 1 & 2, EEMUA 160, Out of Control, and IGasE SR15 - Programmable equipment in safety related applications. Transmitters, communications devices and wiring systems should be arranged to meet the requirements for survivability, protection against external influences and independence.
Independent systems or redundant channels should not share multicore cables with each other or power circuits, and may require diverse routes depending upon the safety integrity level to be achieved. Careful attention to lightning protection (BS 6651) of data links between buildings. Use of fieldbus or other digital communication protocols in protective systems should be considered a novel approach requiring a thorough evaluation and demonstration of the safety integrity. EEMUA 189 'A guide to fieldbus applications in the process industry' provides limited guidance. Utilities may also introduce external influences into the protective systems (e.g. from electrical supplies) . The probability of failure on demand, or the failure rate of a protective system is critically dependent upon the frequency of proof testing and its ability to detect previously unrevealed failures of the system.
The proof test interval should therefore be established accordingly, and as a rule of thumb for low demand systems, should be an order of magnitude less than the mean time between failure of the system and the demand rate. Proof test procedures should be available which specify the success/failure criteria and detail how the test will be performed safely, including any management arrangements, operating restrictions and competence of personnel. Tests performed at the conditions which would be expected at trip. End to end tests at appropriate intervals, including proving sample/impulse lines. Instructions for response to equipment faults including fault alarms. Post maintenance reinstatement and proof testing. For systems where a high diagnostic coverage is claimed, for example high integrity high systems, the probability of failure (expressed as failure rate) is critically dependant upon the mean time to repair the faults revealed.
For such systems, the repair performance should monitored and reviewed against the design criteria. Designed and implementation is carried out by competent persons. Remote diagnostic systems have the potential to cause danger by initiating unexpected operations or by affecting safety functions by software/parameter modification or by diverting the control system processor from time critical functions. Whilst beyond the scope of HS(G)87 'Safety in the remote diagnosis of manufacturing plant and equipment', the publication provides a useful background to the subject. Process control systems are primarily implemented for economic reasons. However, those which are not considered safety related should still be designed, installed, operated and maintained so that their failure does not place a rate demand in the protective system which was not anticipated in its design.exheat.com Part 1 of BS IEC 61508 provides guidance.
The dangerous failure modes of the control system should be determined and taken into account in overall safety system specification. The control system should also be sufficiently independent of the safety systems. The control system may provide steady state or change of state (start-up, shutdown, batch) control functions. The latter may be implemented by automatic sequences or procedurally under manual control. Control systems should be implemented to provide stable control of the process under all expected normal and upset circumstances, including start-up and shutdown. The system should be designed to prevent or verify operator commands which might place a demand upon the protective system. The dangerous failure rate of the control system should be supported by operational experience of the system in a similar application, reliability analysis or reliability data from industry databases. The failure rate that may be claimed may not be less than 10-5 dangerous failures/hour.
Communications failure (at all levels of the architecture).youtube.com Consideration should also be given to change control and software back-up systems. As the control system provides control, monitoring and logging functions which significantly aid the operator, consideration should be given to survival of the control system during hazardous events and emergency response. It should be noted that redundant (non-diverse), cross monitored control processors are extremely vulnerable to common mode failure. It should be demonstrated that the process control system does not exercise safety functions during sequences and changes of state under its control.youtube.com For the purposes of risk evaluation, failure of the control system (at not less than 10-5 failures/hour or 10-1 failures on demand) should be considered as part of the hazard initiation sequence rather than a risk reduction measure.
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